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17 January 1961

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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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17 JANUARY 1961

THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Communist China holding talks with Pakistan on preliminary boundary agreement. (1)

ASIA-AFRICA

Iraq--Anti-Communist elements call general strike in Mosul.

Syria and Jordan request wheat of US.


Situation in the Congo.

Situation in Laos.

(5)

THE WEST

Armed forces plan coup in El Salvador.



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17 January 1961

DAILY BRIEF

THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Communist China - Pakistan: At Peiping's request, talks on a preliminary boundary agreement between Comto Pakistan's foreign minister. The Chinese probably hope to use such an agreement fellow munist China and Pakistan are now under way, according to use such an agreement, following the pattern of recent border accords with Burma and Nepal, to put additional pressure on New Delhi to accept a compromise solution in reach the Sine Indian banks in the Sino-Indian border dispute. Indian claims in the Ladakh that the area might well be projected. area might well be prejudiced by a bilateral Sino-Pakistani Paping took boundary settlement and the diameter boundary settlement, and the dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir would also be further complicated. A preliminary agreement between Peiping and Pakistan would probably call for the establishment of a joint committee to undertake formal demarcation of the border. (Page 1) (Map)

ASIA-AFRICA

Iraq: 'Anti-Communist elements in Mosul, in northern Iraq, began a general strike on 13 January to protest actions by the Qasim regime favoring pro-Communist elements. Students in Mosul have been on strike since 1 January following the arrest of several anti-Communist teachers. During the past several months anti-Communists in Mosul have almost daily been carrying out revenge killings of Communists who helped suppress the March 1959 rebellion. The governor and the commandant of police have tacitly condoned these assassinations. The general strike is an indication that Iraqi anti-Communist elements are becoming bolder in their protests. (Page 2)

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Syria-Jordan: Both Syria and Jordan have within the past few days asked for additional emergency shipments of wheat from the United States. Food shortages which have resulted from three successive years of drought are particularly serious in the Bedouin tribal areas; some 760,000 people in Syria and about 100,000 in Jordan are reported to be in extreme need. Prospects for the 1961 harvest are good; thus the critical immediate requirement is for supplies to tide these people over until August. The Bedouin populations will also need longer-term aid to build up their herds, which have been depleted to about 25 percent of the pre-drought size.

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*Congo: The initiative in eastern Congo remains with the Lumumbist forces and their tribal allies.
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does not plan to take strong action against the dissidents unless ordered to do so by headquarters in Leopoldville.
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believes that the Baluba forces will succeed in setting up another
''independent'' state in northern Katanga. Hammarskjold has
reiterated his confidence in Rajeshwar Dayal, his representative
ot in Leopoldville who is widely believed to be favoring Lumumba,
and has rejected Kasavubu's formal demand of 14 January that
Dayal be recalled.
(Page 3)
*Laos: Government troops on 16 January occupied Vang
Vieng. about 70 miles north of Vientiane,
VICINE. ADMIN. IV III LOS MOLUMO,
The bulk of the Kong Le - Pathet Lao garri-
son at Vang Vieng, which for some time was the drop zone for Revised
The bulk of the Kong Le - Pathet Lao garri- son at Vang Vieng, which for some time was the drop zone for Kenne Constitution of the Kong Le - Pathet Lao garri- Soviet air support flights, was withdrawn prior to 1 January.
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
Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C02000175 Talong the same lines of a national coalition "government." Five of the 18 Soviet LI-2s have left Peiping and were scheduled to arrive in Hanoi on 16 Januarv. Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov expressed to Ambassador Thompson on 14 January his "great concern" over the introduction of T-6 aircraft into Laos. He warned that US action in providing material which tended to expand the conflict could lead to the adoption of similar measures by the bloc. According to Ambassador Thompson. Kuznetsov casually mentioned the possibility of volunteers in this connection. At the same time, however, he reiterated Moscow's desire to prevent any expansion of the conflict. The USSR's intention to maintain maximum freedom of maneuver in the developing Laotian situation was reflected in Kuznetsov's refusal to discuss Soviet Ambassador Menshikov's earlier denial to US officials that Soviet aircraft are airdropping supplies to Communist forces in Laos. These refusals to admit the existence of an airlift would enable the USSR to ignore officially any successful Laotian attempt to interdict the airlift.\ THE WEST El Salvador: The armed forces in El Salvador are reported united behind Defense Minister Castillo in a plan to overthrow the civil-military junta before it permits a Communist ortakeover. The attempt reportedly will be made soon. armed forces plan to enforce strong rule initially through a military directorate in order to bring the Communist threat under control. Non-Communist political parties, however, are to be permitted to continue political activity in preparation for congressional elections which may be called in May. (Page 5)

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Sino-Pakistani Boundary Talks

Communist China and Pakistan are discussing a preliminary boundary agreement, according to the Pakistani foreign minister. The talks apparently follow a recent suggestion by the Chinese Communist ambassador to Pakistan that negotiations be started over the Hunza area and such other regions along the border as Pakistan might wish to discuss. Prior to that time Peiping had not shown any interest in such talks.

Peiping has apparently concluded that its failure to gain any concessions from India after the talks between Chou and Nehru in March 1960 and several months of low-level discussion by Foreign Ministry experts necessitated a change in tactics. The Chinese may hope that even a preliminary border agreement with Pakistan, following boundary accords with Burma and Nepal, will put addition pressure on New Delhi to accept a compromise solution for the Sino-Indian border along lines drawn up by Peiping.

The Chinese probably also feel that a bilateral boundary settlement with Pakistan would prejudice Indian claims in the Ladakh area. The Karakoram mountain range, which might provide the basis for demarcating portions of the Sino-Pakistani border, roughly divides the Indian- and Chinese-occupied parts of Ladakh.

Pakistan has been especially concerned about China's claims to the Pakistani border state of Hunza and apparently hopes to forestall any serious incidents while gaining Peiping's recognition of the "traditional" border. In addition, the Pakistanis probably calculate that China's interest in making a show of progress at this time gives them a transitory bargaining advantage.

A preliminary boundary agreement would likely follow the
pattern of preliminary Chinese border accords with Nepal and
Burma. In each case a joint committee was established to nego-
tiate the formal demarcation, and ground rules were set up to
govern the committee's action.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Anti-Qasim General Strike in Mosul

Fearing that Prime Minister Qasim is about to favor
Mosul's pro-Communist elements, anti-Communists there
began a general strike on 13 January. This action follows a
student strike begun in Mosul schools on 1 January after the
arrest of several anti-Communist teachers. Rumors have
spread in Mosul that Qasim intends to replace two strongly
anti-Communist officialsthe governor and the police chief
who have tacitly condoned revenge killings of Communists
during the past several months. These assassinations, which
have averaged six or seven a week since early last fall, have
been in retaliation for massacres by Communist elements
in the aftermath of the March 1959 Mosul revolt. Although
Iraqi military courts have been carrying out repressive meas-
ures against Iraqi Communists, Qasim has repeatedly
vitiated the courts' work by releasing imprisoned Communists.

On 28 December the Baghdad military court handed down death sentences to seven Communists and gave 22 other Communists and pro-Communists prison sentences for their part in the Mosul massacres; 55 others were sentenced the day before. Meanwhile, the editor of the country's largest Communist paper failed to appear in court on 27 December to face charges of violating censorship regulations; he is believed to have gone underground.

While apparently trying to mollify local Communists, Qasim appears to appreciate the strength of Iraqi "nationalist" sentiment in favor of Arab solidarity. Emphasis on Arabism has become an increasingly dominant theme in his recent speeches: he has frequently referred to the "Arab nation," talked of greater economic and political cooperation, and displayed a less hostile attitude toward the UAR. However, none of these gestures is likely to placate Iraqi anti-Communist and pan-Arab elements. Some plotting against Qasim appears to be continuing, although rivalries between factions have militated so far against efforts to overthrow him.

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The Situation in the Congo

The initiative in the eastern Congo remains with the Lumumbist forces and their tribal allies, who reportedly are becoming more aggressive as a result of recent successes. Baluba tribesmen have cut the rail link between Elisabethville and Kamina air base and, together with troops from Kivu Province, continue to oppose reinforcement of the UN garrison at Manono.

the UN in the area does not plan to take strong action against the dissidents unless ordered to do so by headquarters in Leopoldville. The officer believes that the Baluba forces will succeed in setting up an "independent" state in northern Katanga.

Tshombe's government in Elisabethville reportedly now has imported more than 100 Belgian paracommandos. Although Tshombe apparently distrusts his native troops, Belgian officers with the Katanga forces discount the possibility of dissension among Africans in the armed forces. The native civilians in many of the province's important mining cities reportedly present a threat to order; they apparently have some weapons at their disposal.

UN Secretary General Hammarskjold has reiterated his confidence in Rajeshwar Dayal, his representative in Leopoldville, and has rejected Kasavubu's formal demand of 14 January that Dayal be recalled. Hammarskjold took issue with charges made against Dayal by Kasavubu, but said he would refer the matter to the Security Council for final action.

Dayal has been withholding information and slanting reports in such a way as to favor Lumumba supporters. However, Hammarskjold angrily told American officials on 14 January that he was "very determined" to keep Dayal in the Congo, despite a campaign of "Russian-type" innuendo which he implied was coming from Western sources. Nevertheless Hammarskjold may yet have to appoint a new representative if the UN follows

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	the precedent of acceding to such requests from recognized constate in the country where UN troops are serving.
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Salvadoran Armed Forces Reportedly Planning Coup

The armed forces of El Salvador, under the leadership of the minister of defense, Colonel Castillo Navarette, plan to overthrow the ruling civilian-military junta soon in an attempt to head off a Communist takeover, according to reports being received by US officials in El Salvador. The armed forces, which had been virtually paralyzed by disunity, appear to have been spurred to cooperation by increasingly bold Communist activity in recent weeks. Unrestricted Communist organizational activity among the easily manipulated Salvadoran peasants and the visit to Cuba earlier this month of a group of Salvadoran extremists have particularly heightened the concern of the military.

ganized for the coup, which has the support of important military leaders. A newly formed p public demonstrations in the capital during the give the army a show of popular support for its	"practic olitical p next day	party plans or so to
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The army plan reportedly calls for strong rule initially through a three-man military junta composed of the defense minister, army chief of staff Colonel Portillo, and Colonel Yanez, one of the three military members on the present six-man junta. The new government would permit continued activity by all non-Communist political parties in preparation for congressional elections which may be called next May. The Communist-front April and May Revolutionary party would be outlawed.

The coup planners are said to recognize the possibility of
some bloodshed after they initiate action, and the Communist-
influenced student and labor groups in the capital would probably
attempt counteraction. As long as the army remains united.
however, it could probably control any disorders.

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Executive Secretary, National Security Council

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The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor

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